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Abstract
In this paper, we empirically investigate the link between forecasts transparency
and macroeconomic volatility as measured by inflation and output growth volatility
in developing economies. We adopt the quasi-random controlled experiments metho-
dology that divides our sample of 49 developing countries into three categories on the
basis of their forecasts transparency. The first category is composed of central banks
that are completely opaque over our sample period. The second type of countries is
constantly transparent about their forecasts over the period of study while the third
category includes central banks that have recently started to disclose their forecasts.
In contrast to the previous literature, we interestingly find that increasing forecasts
transparency unambiguously leads to higher macroeconomic volatility in developing
countries. Indeed, we find that both groups of countries that constantly disclose their
forecasts and that have only recently started to disclose their forecasts experience
an increase in their macroeconomic volatility compared to the remaining group of
countries that are completely opaque. Our results however indicate that forecasts
transparency may have some stabilizing effects if and only if it is practiced along with
other forms of institutional transparency.
Keywords: Forecasts transparency; monetary policy transparency; central bank-
ing; inflation volatility; output volatility.
JEL Classification: E58; E63; C33; C36.
1 Introduction
Monetary policy transparency has various dimensions. For reasons related to both eco-
nomics and politics, a minimum level of transparency is considered desirable. An issue,
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however, that still needs a consensus concerns the relationship between different forms of
transparency and the macroeconomic environment. Both theoretical and empirical studies
have contributed to this debate. From a theoretical perspective, an effective management
of agents expectations for instance requires a future-oriented monetary policy. Even more
important, forward-looking monetary policy reduces lags in the effects of policy decisions
and helps to mitigate the rules versus discretions conflict in policy making (Svensson, 1997;
Woodford, 2003 and 2007). Nonetheless, a number of recent studies find that greater dis-
closure of information can be harmful for stabilization policies ( Morris and Shin, 2002;
Baeriswyl and Cornand, 2010; James and Lawler, 2011); or that ambiguity is welfare en-
hancing if it allows greater discretion in pursuing alternative policy goals (Cukierman and
Meltzer, 1986; Geraats, 2007; Walsh, 2008).
Empirical findings on the effects of transparency also highlight the conflicting conclu-
sions of the theoretical literature. For instance, among the few empirical studies on the
issue, Demertzis and Hughes-Hallet (2007) find, contrary to their theoretical predictions,
a positive relation between output volatility and transparency. Whereas, Chortareas et al.
(2002) and Dincer and Eichengreen (2010) find that transparency reduces macroeconomic
volatility.
It has been noted that empirical studies on the effects of transparency fail in many
important aspects. For instance, a large part of the empirical literature focuses on a
general measure of transparency assuming complementarity between various aspects of
transparency. This assumption is not necessarily true as political transparency cannot
complement forecasts transparency. Similarly, there are only few studies that relate the
effects of transparency to its degree. In this regard, Van der Cruijsen et al., (2010)
provide a robust evidence that an intermediate degree of overall transparency is optimal
in reducing inflation persistence. What is still not known, however, is to what extent
forecasts transparency is desirable in the presence of other forms of transparency.
This paper empirically contributes to this literature by focusing on the effects of fore-
casts transparency on macroeconomic volatility in developing countries. To our knowledge,
this paper is the first one to apply the quasi-natural experiments methodology
to deal with this issue. There is an abundant theoretical literature that favors forecasts
transparency as a feature of monetary policy strategy (see van der Cruijsen and Eijffin-
ger, 2010 for a survey). However, previous studies analyze the influence of transparency
clubbing together its various aspects. Thus, there is no distinction between political
transparency (which has average score of 2 across our sample of countries) and economic
transparency (which has an average score of 0.60 across our sample of countries). It is only
recently that empirical literature has started analyzing the individual impact of different
forms of transparency and their relative desirability (Crowe and Meade, 2008; Cruijsen et
al., 2010; Mazhar, 2013).
Our paper approaches the issue of forecasts transparency in two novel aspects. First,
it designs a quasi-random experiment by dividing central banks into different groups ac-
cording to their levels of forecasts transparency. Second, we focus on a relatively similar
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set of countries. Our sample includes 49 middle income economies where a middle income
economy is defined to be either lower middle income or higher middle income economy fol-
lowing World Bank classification1. Despite being reasonably similar in their institutional
setting and level of economic development, these countries exhibit significant differences in
terms of forecasts disclosures. This allows us to perform a meaningful comparison across
central banks with different transparency practices.
Our analysis draws on unique insights about transparency to particularly investigate
the impact of forecasts transparency on inflation volatility and output growth volatility
controlling for the influence of various other forms of transparency. Our findings interest-
ing suggest that forecasts transparency has an independent and significant positive impact
on macroeconomic volatility. In other words, forecasts transparency makes the macroe-
conomic environment more instable in developing countries. However, it may have some
stabilizing effects only if it is practiced along with other forms of transparency components.
Our findings contribute to the existing literature in different ways. Firstly, as noted
by Calvo and Mishkin (2003) and Fraga et al. (2003), developing countries are generally
characterised by greater macroeconomic volatility compared to developed economies. Our
findings suggests that monetary policy transparency can be one way of achieving greater
stability if reliable forecasting communication mechanism is established along with other
dimensions of transparency. Secondly, we try to quantify the effects of forecasts trans-
parency and to highlight their relative worth in comparison to other sources of stabiliza-
tion.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents and describes
our empirical methodology and dataset. Section 3 presents and analyzes our results.
Finally, we present the conclusion of the paper in Section 4.
2 Methodology and dataset
Our methodology consists in differentiating between three types of countries in our sample
of 49 middle income countries. In the first category, we have central banks with zero
forecasts transparency. In other words, the first category includes those central banks
that are completely opaque about their forecasts over our sample period that is, from
1998 to 20072. The second group of countries is transparent about their forecasts but
their forecasts transparency remains constant over the period of our study. The final
category includes central banks that move from zero to positive transparency over our
sample period.
Our measure of transparency comes from Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) transparency
1According to the World Bank classification, a middle income country is one having per capita GDP
between 3976 to 12275 US dollars whereas lower middle income group have per capita income between
1006 to 3975 US dollars.
2Siklos (2011) provides transparency scores for 100 central banks over a period from 1998 to 2009. To
avoid any issue relating to financial crisis which will complicate our analysis, we restrict the upper limit
of our sample period to 2007.
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index (hence, EG index) which has become a standard gauge of transparency3. We use the
EG index as updated by Siklos (2011)4 to proxy transparency across different dimensions.
The 5 components of the EG index are detailed in Table 1 in the Appendix. Each of
these five components has three sub-indices. Hence, 15 sub-indices compose the general
EG index. The minimum score of each sub-index is 0, and the maximum is 1, with higher
score corresponding to higher level of transparency. Summing all the 15 sub-indices’
scores yields the general EG index. Consequently, the EG index has a minimum of 0, and
a maximum of 15.
The classification of central banks in our sample depends on their forecasts trans-
parency (sub-index B.1 in Table 1 in Appendix). The group of countries with zero fore-
casts transparency throughout the period of study (called ZeroTr group) is our control
group. The group with positive forecasts transparency throughout the period is our treat-
ment group (abbreviated as PositiveK ). The third group (called ChangeTr) is primarily
meant to highlight the before and after effect of switching from zero to positive forecasts
transparency. Ideally we should compare the performance of the group PositiveK before
1998 to its performance over our sample period. However, it is not feasible as there is no
forecasts transparency measure available for all the countries prior to 1998 period. Ad-
mittedly, absence of measure before 1998 does not mean absence of transparency. Thus,
if we compare periods prior to 1998 with period of our study, we cannot identify causal
effect of transparency. By number of countries, the largest category is ChangeTr that
includes 23 countries. The categories ZeroTr and PostiiveK contain respectively 19 and 7
countries. Table 2 in the appendix provides definitions and sources for all variables used
in our study as well as our sample of countries, and summary statistics across our three
groups are presented in Table 3.
3 The empirical model
Our empirical model estimates the following equation:
InfV olit = f(dummies of forecasts transparency, transparency, control variables),
where i=1, 2, ..., 49 denotes country and t=1998, ..., 2007 denotes year.
A similar specification is used for output growth volatility (GrVol) as dependent varia-
ble. We calculate inflation volatility (respectively output growth volatility) as 5 years
moving standard deviation. This technique is standard in the literature investigating the
determinants of macroeconomic volatility (Blanchard and Simon, 2001; Cecchetti et al.,
3The EG index is however not free of weaknesses. As pointed out by Claussen (2008) many times
transparency comparisons across central banks blow up the differences and lead to misleading conclusion.
We believe that our sample being reasonably similar do not suffer from this weakness.
4Geraats (2002) classify five dimensions of transparency in terms of policy processes: political, economic,
procedural, policy, and operational. Political transparency is about the clarity of objectives, economic
transparency covers information used for the policy decision, procedural transparency relates to the decision
making process, policy transparency to the monetary policy stance, and operational transparency to the
effects of monetary policy implementation.
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2006).
As noted before, there are three categories of central banks in our sample according to
their numerical forecasts disclosures. We include dummies for PositiveK and ChangeTr
categories while taking ZeroTr as the reference category. The value of transparency scores
(TrIndexAdj ) is included after excluding the forecasts transparency component. In other
words, this variable represents the scores of the EG index after the component numerical
macroeconomic forecasts (aspect B.1 in Table 1) has been excluded.
In addition to forecasts dummies and transparency index, we also control for a number
of relevant variables. For instance greater trade openness can increase or decrease the
macroeconomic volatility depending upon various geographical, logistic, and terms of trade
related factors (Bowdler and Malik, 2005). Previous studies also find a role for openness
although its direction is not yet clear (Cecchetti et al., 2006; and Cabanilas and Ruscher,
2008). Moreover, it is important to control for openness and increased interdependence
among countries to account for the impact of global conditions on individual economies
(Stock and Watson, 2005). All these reasons give rational for the inclusion of openness in
our empirical model.
To control for the effect of institutional factors and overall living standard, we include
GDP per capita in purchasing power parity US dollars. However, we cannot expect a
strong influence of GDP per capita on our dependent variables because of the relatively
homogenous nature of our sample in terms of GDP per capita.
Many studies also point out the role of energy ratio (as a percentage of GDP) in
reducing macroeconomic volatility. For example, Nakov and Pescatori (2010) show that
a lesser reliance on oil mitigates the impact of oil price shocks. In particular, many
middle income economies experience greater volatility because of their greater reliance on
petroleum imports. Therefore, without controlling for the influence of this factor, it will
be hard to interpret our estimates ceteris paribus.
Another important determinant of macroeconomic volatility is inventory investment.
It is found that greater flexibility and timeliness in inventory management stabilizes output
(McConell and Perez-Quiros, 2000). However, in cross-country setting, Cecchetti et al.
(2006) and Cabanillas and Ruscher (2008) find that changes in inventory investment are
negatively correlated with output volatility.
The share of services sector in the composition of GDP is found to have a stabilizing
effect on output and price volatility. Arguably, increasing share of services in the GDP
growth indicates an evolution of the economic structure towards higher stage of develop-
ment. Therefore, we can expect the share of services to have a negative impact on output
growth volatility.
Another issue we should consider is that, it is not obvious that transparency and
macroeocnomic volatility are related linearly. Thus, to take into account this possible
non-linear relationship, we also construct a non-linear model by introducing interaction
terms. We believe that it will allow us to evaluate the robustness of the results we gather
from the linear regression analysis.
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4 Results
As a first step towards our empirical analysis, we conduct a simple comparison of means
test between our three groups of countries. To this end, we follow Wooldridge (2013)
and run a simple regression with InfVol (respectively, GrVol) as our dependent variable
taking each of the group dummy variable in return. This test tells whether the groups
are significantly different from each other in terms of their macroeconomic volatility or
not. For instance, our results in Table 4 indicate that central banks with ZeroTr have
significantly low inflation volatility than all the rest. However, although their relatively
less volatility is indicated by a negative coefficient on GrVol, it is not significant at con-
ventional levels. Similarly, the category PositiveK exhibits a significantly more output
growth volatility than all the rest of central banks, while central banks which change their
forecasts transparency status experience a significantly greater inflation volatility than all
the remaining groups of central banks in our sample. This test is very general as it cannot
differentiate between the more than two categories at a time, which tends to limit its
scope. Nevertheless, it allows us to acknowledge the existence of significant differences in
the macroeconomic behavior between our three groups of countries.
Table 5 presents the results of the impact of forecasts transparency on inflation volati-
lity. Our basic specification is presented in column (1). It contains transparency scores
adjusted for forecasts transparency (TrIndexAdj ) and two dummy variables which re-
present two out of three groups in our sample namely, PositiveK and ChangeTr. Among
control variables, the basic specification includes Openness (Openness), GDP per capita
(GDPpc) and energy ratio ( EnergyRatio).
As shown in the last row, the overall model is highly significant. The presented results
are also robust against heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation for order one5. Our results
indicate a significant negative effect of TrIndexAdj on inflation volatility. The coefficient
has a meaningful magnitude indicating that a one percentage increase in the overall ad-
justed transparency index reduces the standard deviation of inflation by approximately
0.82 point. Putting this in our context, the mean value of inflation volatility in our sample
is 4.51. Thus, our results indicate that for an average central bank, a one point increase
in the adjusted transparency index, keeping all the other things unchanged, will reduce
inflation volatility to 3.69.
Openness is measured as a percentage of GDP. Its coefficient is negative but insigni-
ficant. Even when it is significant (as in models in columns (2) and (3)), it indicates
a marginal reduction in inflation volatility. Thus, with reference to the regression in
column (2), a one percentage increase in openness reduces inflation volatility by 0.02 per
cent. This result may reflect an inadequate measurement of openness through the ratio of
imports plus exports to GDP. Indeed, this measure ignores many factors that determine
the impact of openness on macroeconomic variables such as the quality of institutions and
logistic facilities.
5Specifically, we use Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors that are robust against heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation.
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As for GDP per capita, it appears to have a significant positive impact on inflation
volatility although this effect does not contain much economic magnitude. It may indicate
inexistence of a linear relationship or an indirect relation between GDP per capita and
inflation volatility.
We find that energy ratio has a significant negative impact on inflation volatility. This
is consistent with the earlier findings documented by Nakov and Pescatori (2010) and
Mazhar (2013). In terms of magnitude, a one percent increase in energy ratio reduces
inflation volatility by 0.70 point. This result indicates that a more efficient use of energy
or greater productivity due to technological improvement likely stabilizes inflation.
Our findings also indicate a stabilizing influence of inventory investment. Thus, greater
efficiency and timeliness in the management of inventory reduces inflation volatility. Ac-
cording to our evidence, if inventory investment increases by a million US dollars, the
inflation volatility will reduce by 1 point indicating a weak economic effect.
Coming to our variables of interest, we find that those central banks maintaining a
positive level of macroeconomic forecasts transparency experience more inflation volatility
than those which maintain zero forecasts transparency. More specifically, the estimated
coefficient implies that the PositiveK group of countries has 3.4 points higher level of
inflation volatility than the ZeroTr group. Similar pattern is displayed by the ChangeTr
group: It almost shows 4 points higher inflation volatility than the ZeroTr group. These
results point out a novel aspect of transparency: increasing forecasts transparency in-
creases inflation volatility at least in the case of developing countries. This is in contrast
with previous studies which found a stabilizing effect of forecasts transparency (Chortareas
et al., 2002).
Our findings could however be explained by the specific features of developing coun-
tries. As noted by Calvo and Mishkin (2003) and Fraga et al. (2003), one of the main
characteristics of developing countries in general and emerging countries in particular is
the presence of weak fiscal and monetary institutions. Weak fiscal institutions means that
in order to finance their deficits, governments in these countries regularly put pressures on
central banks so that to adopt inflationary policies leading to weak monetary institutions.
As agents learn from the behavior of the central bank, increasing forecasts transparency
will lead to greater volatility as they disbelieve in the ability of the central bank to provide
reliable macroeconomic forecasts. Hence, being opaque about macroeconomic forecasts in
these countries may be useful in the sense that it lessens reputation loss by hiding the real
intents of central banks.
In columns (2) and (3) we add other important determinants of inflation volatility.
In column (2) we add the share of services sector in GDP while in column (3) we add
inventory investment change. The results in columns (2) and (3) remain similar to those
in column (1). The positive effect of forecasts transparency on inflation volatility remains
unchanged although the magnitude of the coefficients of dummy variables decreases in
both cases.
It is possible that forecasts transparency has stabilizing properties when taken in re-
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lation to other aspects of transparency. To inspect this, we include interaction terms
of our group dummy variable with TrIndexAdj. As is shown in column (4), our con-
trol variables (that is, GDP per capita and openness) now appear to be insignificant in
mitigating inflation volatility. However, the results of transparency again indicate that
forecasts transparency is harmful. The interaction effect of PostiveK and TrIndexAdj is
positive and significant while the marginal effect of PositiveK is insignificant. On the
other hand however, the interaction effect of ChangeTr and TrIndexAdj is negative and
significant, although the marginal effect remains significantly positive. This result indi-
cates that even when its dependence on other forms of transparency is taken into account,
forecasts transparency has ambiguous stabilizing effect on inflation volatility.
In Table 6 we follow the same specifications as in Table 5 but with output growth
volatility as our dependent variable. In this case however, coefficients of control variables
are less significant. For instance, openness has no significant effect on output growth
volatility in any of the Table 6 regressions. Similarly, GDP per capita also has a negligible
impact, if at all. Both share of services and inventory change reduce output growth
volatility which is in line with the previous findings.
Again the dummy variables on forecasts transparency are mostly positive and signi-
ficant. The results indicate that compared to central banks having zero forecasts trans-
parency, those which remain consistently transparent over our sample period or those
which turn toward forecasts transparency experience greater output growth volatility.
This is particularly in contrast with the findings of Chortareas et al. (2002) who have
shown that there is no evidence that forecasts transparency increases output volatility.
However in terms of interaction terms (shown in column (4) in Table 6), the effect of both
PositiveK and ChangeTr on output volatility is significantly negative indicating a stabi-
lizing effect on output growth volatility. The marginal effect of PositiveK is nonetheless
significantly positive but the marginal effect of ChangeTr is insignificant.
To summarize our findings, we can put forward that forecasts transparency in it-
self unambiguously increases macroeconomic volatility in developing countries but if it is
practiced along with other forms of institutional transparency, it is likely to have some
stabilizing effects.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we empirically analyze the effects of macroeconomic forecasts transparency
on inflation and output growth volatility in developing countries. The previous literature,
both theoretical and empirical, does not lead to a unanimous consensus about the relation
between forecasts transparency and macroeconomic volatility. Given the relevance of fore-
casts transparency in forward-looking monetary policy effectiveness, it appears necessary
to investigate more deeply this issue.
We however adopt a novel approach to this issue by performing a quasi-random con-
trolled experiments methodology that divides our sample of 49 developing countries into
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three categories on the basis of their forecasts transparency practices. The first group,
denoted by ZeroTr, is the one that never discloses any numerical forecasts over our sam-
ple period. The second category includes central banks that remain transparent over our
sample period. Moreover, their transparency level remains unchanged over our estimation
period. The third category includes countries that change their forecasts transparency
score from zero to positive over our sample period that is, they are central banks that
start disclosing forecasts only recently.
Our results indicate that compared to ZeroTr group, both PositiveK and ChangeTr
groups experienced an increase in their macroeconomic volatility, while transparency scores
(excluding forecasts transparency scores) appear to stabilize the macroeconomic volati-
lity. These findings are robust to the inclusion of other determinants of macroeconomic
volatility and interaction terms.
In terms of policy recommendation, our study has a clear message: forecasts trans-
parency in itself unambiguously increases macroeconomic volatility in developing coun-
tries. However, it may have some stabilizing effects if and only if it is practiced along with
other forms of transparency. But to the extent that these countries suffer from weak fiscal
and monetary institutions, we recommend them to improve the quality of their institu-
tions for instance by improving central bank independence along with increasing their level
of overall transparency in order to insure strong macroeconomic effects of transparency
policies.
Our evidence is based on a group of developing countries. An open avenue for future
research is to perform the same analysis for developed economies so that to highlight more
general policy implications.
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Appendix
Table 1. Aspects of Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) Transparency Index 
Major Index Sub-index  
A. Political Transparency  1. Monetary Policy Objectives  
 2. With prioritization  
 3. Explicit instrument independence 
  
B. Economic Transparency  1. Numerical macroeconomic forecasts  
 2. Quarterly, medium term for inflation and output 
 3. Macroeconomic policy model 
  
C. Procedural 
Transparency 
1. Monetary policy strategy 
 2. Minutes 
 3. Voting records 
  
D. Policy Transparency 1. Policy adjustment  
 2. Policy explanation 
 3. Policy inclination 
  
E. Operational 
Transparency  
1. Control error operating target  
 2. Transmission disturbances 
 3. Evaluating monetary policy outcomes  
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Table 2. Variables Definitions and Sources and sample countries 
Variable  Definition (Mean; St Dev) Source  
InfVol  Inflation volatility is the 5 
year moving standard 
deviation of inflation where 
inflation is annual percentage 
change in consumer price 
index (4.51; 8.38). 
Inflation is taken from World 
Economic Outlook, IMF (2011). 
GrVol Output growth volatility is 
the 5 year moving standard 
deviation of annual output 
growth rate where annual 
growth rate is the percentage 
change in GDP in constant 
2005 US dollars (2.72; 1.79). 
Same as above. 
TrIndexAdj  An overall index of 
transparency. Originally it 
includes political, economic, 
procedural, policy, and 
operational aspects of 
transparency. Included in the 
regression after subtracting 
the scores of forecasts 
transparency (one of the sub-
components of economic 
transparency) (4.06; 2.09). 
Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) 
transparency index as provided 
by Siklos (2011). 
PositiveK A dummy variable for 
forecasts transparency. It 
assumes a value of 1 for 
those central banks 
maintaining full forecasts 
transparency throughout our 
sample period. The measure 
of forecasts transparency is 
one sub-index of Eijffinger 
and Geraats transparency 
index. Their measure of 
forecasts transparency is 
obtained as an answer to the 
question: Does the central 
bank regularly publish its 
own macroeconomic forecast?  
Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) 
transparency index as provided 
by Siklos (2011). 
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Table 2. (Continued) 
Variable  Definition (Mean; St Dev) Source  
ChangeTr A dummy variable for 
forecasts transparency. It 
assumes a value of 1 for 
those central banks that have 
changed their forecasts 
transparency from zero to 
positive over our sample 
period. The measure of 
forecasts transparency is one 
sub-index of Eijffinger and 
Geraats transparency index. 
Their measure of forecasts 
transparency is obtained as 
an answer to the question: 
Does the central bank 
regularly publish its own 
macroeconomic forecasts?   
Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) 
transparency index as provided 
by Siklos (2011). 
Openness  Percentage of imports plus 
exports to GDP (80.57; 35.89) 
PWT(2011) 
GDPpc  GDP per capita in PPP US 
dollars (5759; 3372). 
IMF (2011) 
EnergyRatio GDP per unit of energy use is 
the GDP per kilogram of oil 
equivalent of energy use 
where GDP is measured in 
2005 constant purchasing 
power parity dollars. 
WDI (2011) 
ServShare Percentage value addition by 
services sector in GDP of a 
country  (53.73; 11.87). 
WDI (2011) 
InventChg It is the value of the change 
in inventories (measured in 
constant 2005 US dollars) 
(341.0; 1217). 
UN Data 
http://data.un.org/Explorer.aspx 
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Table 2. (Continued) 
Sample of countries (World Bank Classification, Total 49) 
Positive but constant forecasts transparency (PositiveK): It includes all 
the countries whose level of forecasts transparency remains positive but 
unchanged throughout our sample period (that is, 1998-2007).  
India, Mauritius, Moldova, Namibia, Solomon Islands, Sri-lanka, Uruguay 
(Total 7).  
Zero forecasts transparency (ZeroTr): It includes all the countries that 
have zero forecasts transparency throughout our sample period.  
Armenia, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Guyana, 
Jordan, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, 
Tunisia, Ukraine, Yemen (Total 19). 
Change in forecasts transparency (ChangeTr): It includes all the 
countries that have changed their transparency from zero to positive over 
our sample period.  
Albania, Argentina, Belarus, Belize, Brazil, Chile, China, Columbia, Fiji, 
Georgia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Romania, South Africa, Thailand, 
Turkey (Total 23). 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics Across Groups 
  ZeroTr 
(19 countries) 
PositiveK 
(7 countries) 
ChangeTr 
(23 countries) 
 Mean(Std.Dev) Obs. Mean(Std.Dev) Obs. Mean(Std.Dev) Obs. 
InfVol 3.64 (3.31) 123 4.03 (3.37) 49 5.34 (11.58) 157 
GrVol 2.58 (1.76) 123 3.24 (2.05) 49 2.66 (1.70) 157 
TrIndexAdj 3.04 (1.56) 190 3.95 (1.76) 70 4.93 (2.18) 230 
Openness 81.10 (30.57) 190 85.14 (32.48) 70 78.74 (40.64) 230 
GDPpc 5339 (3679) 179 4644 (3159) 70 6425 (3039) 230 
EnergyRatio 4.65 (2.31) 167 7.60 (4.06) 58 6.12 (2.75) 208 
ServShare 51.27 (14.11) 178 57.96 (6.29) 70 54.36 (10.81) 227 
InventChg 101.4 (414.7) 166 256.2 (728.4) 70 539.8 (1625) 230 
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Table 4. Difference in Means Test: Each Group versus Rest of the Sample 
 InfVol GrVol Obs. 
ZeroTr -1.388* -0.209 329 
 (0.774) (0.202)  
PositiveK -0.561 0.613*** 329 
 (0.719) (0.308)  
ChangeTr 1.587* -0.115 329 
 (0.958) (0.196)  
Notes: Test is conducted by regressing InfVol (respectively, GrVol) on each of the 
group dummy. Constant is included but not reported. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses; *** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5. Inflation volatility and forecasts transparency.  
Dependent Variable: Inflation Volatility 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
TrIndexAdj -0.818** -0.739* -0.768** -0.210 
 (0.404) (0.368) (0.337) (0.203) 
PositiveK 3.394** 2.095*** 1.309** -1.454 
 (1.515) (0.771) (0.491) (1.035) 
ChangeTr 3.977** 3.050** 3.010** 5.507*** 
 (1.818) (1.348) (1.211) (1.806) 
Openness -0.011 -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.016 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) 
GDPpc 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EnergyRatio -0.703**    
 (0.274)    
ServShare  -0.101**   
  (0.041)   
InventChg   -0.001***  
   (0.000)  
Interactions      
PositiveK*TrIndexAdj    0.579* 
    (0.304) 
ChangeTr*TIndexAdj    -0.831** 
    (0.340) 
Marginal Effects     
PositiveK    0.683 
(Delta-Method std.err.)    (0.542) 
Change    2.438** 
(Delta-Method std.err.)    (1.088) 
Observations 285 317 315 329 
R-squared 0.080 0.049 0.046 0.044 
Countries 47 48 46 48 
F-test for overall 
significance p-value1 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Notes: HAC St ndard errors reported in parentheses. Constant is 
included but not reported.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. F-test tests 
the null hypothesis that all the regressors except constant are zero. 
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Table 6. Output growth volatility and forecasts transparency 
Dependent Variable: Output growth volatility 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
TrIndexAdj -0.166*** -0.200*** -0.211*** 0.018 
 (0.020) (0.043) (0.032) (0.106) 
PositiveK 0.499 1.314*** 0.849** 2.090** 
 (0.334) (0.385) (0.359) (1.005) 
ChangeTr 0.172 0.665** 0.381* 1.182*** 
 (0.275) (0.301) (0.225) (0.438) 
Openness -0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
GDPpc 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EnergyRatio -0.037    
 (0.041)    
ServShare  -0.025***   
  (0.008)   
InventChg   -0.000***  
   (0.000)  
Interactions      
PositiveK*TrIndexAdj    -0.386* 
    (0.230) 
ChangeTr*TrIndexAdj    -0.269** 
    (0.119) 
Marginal Effects     
PositiveK    0.667* 
(Delta-Method std.err.)    (0.354) 
ChangeTr    0.188 
(Delta-Method std.err.)    (0.239) 
     
Observations 285 317 315 329 
R-squared 0.038 0.096 0.060 0.070 
Countries 47 48 46 48 
F-test for overall 
significance p-value1 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Notes: HAC Standard errors reported in parentheses. Constant is included but 
not reported.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. F-test tests the null hypothesis that 
all the regressors except constant are zero. 
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